Nature of the Moral Law

 

 Quranic Foundations And Structure Of Muslim Society

Chapter 2.

THE MORAL LAW

 

1. Nature of the Moral Law:

The Qur’an affirms the following characteristics in respect of the nature of Moral Law:

1.       Besides the regard for the transcendental value of Divine Pleasure—which in itself makes the action most highly disinterested from the practical human point of view—it should not be conditioned by any interest other than morality. We are told:

“O you who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah (i.e., act solely out of respect for the Moral Law given by Allah) as witnesses to fair  dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just …” (5:9).

Again:

“And among mankind is he who would sell his ‘Self’ to the seeking of Allah’s Pleasure (alone) (i.e., seeking no other end but only the intrinsic good contained in the observance of the divinely-ordained Moral Law) …” (2:207).

 

2.       The Moral Law has been conceived as universally binding, i.e., binding on all rational beings—a principle contained in the following Qur’anic affirmation:^[1]

“Do they seek for other than the Divine Law?—while all (creatures) in the heavens and on the earth have, willing or unwilling, bowed to His Will (i.e., accepted the Divine Law), and to Him shall they all return.” (3:83). 

 

3.       The Moral Law is to be obeyed as unconditionally and absolutely binding:^[2] 

“They (i.e., the human beings) have never any choice (but to obey the Divine Law).” (28:68).

Again, as regards Muslims:

“The answer of the Believers, when summoned to Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad) in order that he (Muhammad) may judge between them, is no other than this: They say, ‘We hear and we obey’: It is such as these that will attain felicity.” (24:51).

[Note on Kant’s Categorical Imperative: Before we proceed to the next section, it is necessary to discuss Kant’s famous Categorical Imperative.

Among eminent moral thinkers of the modern age, Kant enjoys the distinction of not only being the most eminent but also of presenting an ethical philosophy which is nearer to the Qur’anic ethical view than any other, so near in fact that in certain aspects the stand-points of the Holy Qur’an and of Kant appear to be identical. This necessitates that while we have stated the Qur’anic view concerning the ‘standard as Law’, we should have a clear understanding of the Kantian Categorical Imperative. 

To begin with: Kant names the normative laws as ‘imperatives’ and says that they are of three kinds, namely: (1) the hypothetical imperative, which is not universally applicable and holds only under certain conditions; (2) the assertorial imperative, which can be conceived as universally applicable, but only in respect of the attainment of certain ends; and (3) the categorical imperative, which holds universally as well as unconditionally. He further says that the Moral Law is the only law that falls under the category of the categorical imperative; and he lays down the rule: “There is nothing good without qualification except the good will”, thus denying all teleology in morals whereby action is conceived to be morally good in respect of its being conducive to certain desirable consequences. (Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Sec. 2, E.T., Abbot, pp. 31-33).

Trying to understand Kant’s view of the Categorical Imperative critically, the very first criticism that emerges is that, as defined by him, it is a ‘form without content’; or, it is the ‘ideal’ divorced from the ‘real’. Hence it cannot enjoy as such the status which Kant gives to it in his philosophy. To put it concretely: ‘To will always what is good’ ought to be accepted as a valid principle, but that does not as such provide any guidance in respect of ‘willing the good’ in particular situations.

As regards the Holy Qur’an, it also prescribes a categorical imperative with regard to the maintenance of the good will. But in the Qur’anic view, what is unconditionally and universally binding is strictly the obligation of Obedience to the Moral Law, which derives its authority, not from any utopian transcendental deduction—as in Kant, but from the absolute authority of the Absolute Good Will of the Moral Ruler of the universe, i.e., God. Moreover, it does not stop at the ‘form’ of the Categorical Imperative but also teaches its practical application in the concrete situations of moral action.

Kant lays down three laws in respect of the application of the Categorical Imperative, viz., (1) ‘Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to become universal law’; (2) ‘Treat every rational being including yourself always as an end and never as a means’; (3) ‘A principle of moral conduct is morally binding on me if, and only if, I can regard it as a law which I impose on myself’.

As to the first law, it stands challenged on different counts. Firstly, numerous situations in practical human life are conceivable where this law cannot be validly applied; for instance, becoming a teacher of a particular branch of knowledge, which is morally good but cannot be universalised. Secondly, Kant has bestowed on an unreal abstraction of one condition (i.e., obedience to a universal law) the status of being the essential condition for good will. Thirdly, he has confused the merit of performing an action with its goodness. Fourthly, he has erred in holding, as Professor Broad has pointed out (Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 124 f), that a right action—right in respect of the factor of universality—must always be right, no matter what the inclinations of the agent are. For instance, if a man and a woman are married on considerations of Pure Reason, where alone the principle of universality resides, and no consideration is given to their respective inclinations and their unique circumstances, that marriage may prove to be evil for both of them, and not good in any sense of the word. Thus, the mere formal consistency which Kant has emphasised—i.e., that the rule of an action should be willed to be the rule of every person—can never by itself make an action good in terms of morality.

As to the second law, its validity may be said to have been challenged by Kant himself, inasmuch as his ethical philosophy makes every human being, in respect of the realisation of the moral law, a mere means, so that he no more remains ‘an end’!

As to the third law, it is correct in the sense that moral law, as distinguished from the political law, is surely a law that our own moral consciousness—our own conscience, and not any other factor, should make us incline to obey. It should form the behest of our higher self. Yet moral law should not be accepted as merely selfimposed, because the self can also dispense with it even as it can impose. Consequently it should be combined with the element of absolute authority, and such an authority can only be the authority of God.]

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[1] Cf. the Holy Prophet’s verdict:

“None of you can have (real) belief (in Islam) until he loves for all human beings what he loves for himself.” (Ahmad: Musnad, vol. 3, p. 272).

[2] Because it emanates from the Absolute Good Will and is directed to the establishment of good will among human beings. As to the merit of good will, Kant expresses it beautifully thus: “If with its greatest efforts (the good will) should yet achieve nothing and there should remain only the good will (not to be sure a mere wish but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself.” (Kant: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Sec. 1, E. T., Abbot, p. 10).

Source

to be continued . . . . . 

Quranic Foundation & Structure Of Muslim Society In The End Times